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BOOK REVIEW
AT HIS DISCRETION (N.): "TO BE
DISPOSED OF AS HE THINKS FIT; AT HIS
DISPOSAL, AT HIS MERCY;
UNCONDITIONALL Y"I
J. AMY DILLARD·
ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE (Oxford University Press, Inc.
2007) 264 PP.
From the misguided Duke rape prosecution to the White House firings
of U.S. Attorneys, our society is focusing anew on the role of the
prosecutor. The unchecked power of Michael Nifong in Durham, North
Carolina led to a year-long discussion of race, wealth, sex, and ultimately
the power of the prosecutor. Nifong's abuses have led to his personal
downfall, loss of bar membership, and a criminal investigation into whether
his acts warrant his own prosecution? Similarly, with the U.S. Attorney
firings, the need for a free prosecutor who does not suffer the politicization
of duty has become a paramount concern. 3 The White House influence
over whether and when U.S. Attorneys should prosecute capital crimes and
seek the death penalty has created an unlikely marriage between defense
attorneys and prosecutors in the fight for prosecutorial independence.

I 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 756 (2d ed. 1989) .
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; J.D., Washington
and Lee University Law School; B.A., Wellesley College. Many thanks to the prosecutors
that I count as friends, among them Joe Michael, Paige McThenia, and Alex Hammack; and
to Karen Woody, for editing and listening.
2 Durham-in-Wonderland: Comments and Analysis About the DukelNifong Case,
http://durhamwonderland.blogspot.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2007).
3 See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales, Senators Spare on Credibility, WASH.
POST, July 25, 2007, at AI.
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With her book Arbitrary Justice, Professor Angela J. Davis has tackled
the sticky topic of prosecutorial discretion and abuse. 4 Anyone who has
been a criminal trial lawyer, either for the defense or for the prosecution,
will find Davis's book familiar and thorough. Davis is, first and foremost, a
public defender, and like many of us, she values the work she did as a
public defender as "the most important work I have ever done or will ever
do.,,5 In her recitation of cases of prosecutorial misconduct and abuse,
Davis is a trustworthy narrator because of her deep, personal experience.
From years of personal experience and research, Davis is able to
provide a complete rendering of the criminal justice system with an
examination of the role and power of the prosecutor at each stage. Without
a hint of sarcasm, Davis presumes that most prosecutors are wellintentioned, honest, and genuinely trying to do a good job. 6 This
presumption makes her book useful rather than scandalous. She believes in
the system she served for many years, and she writes as one who seeks
more accountability for prosecutors and reform in governance to achieve it.
The moral imperative that Davis enjoys in her commentary comes from
experience, distance, and the presumption that the road to prison, for many,
is paved with the good intentions of misguided prosecutors.
Davis's major complaint with the sins of prosecutors comes less as an
indictment of the prosecutors themselves and more as a criticism of the
unchecked power and discretion of the prosecutor.? Underlying this lack of
accountability is the misconduct of the prosecutor, which often stems from
lack of preparation, lack of maturity, or lack of a full understanding of the
prosecutor's complex role. The most basic principle is that the role of
prosecutor is not adversarial. But because the nature of litigation is always
adversarial, this guiding principle of the prosecutor as a minister of justice,
even to the defendant, is often lost.
My law school mentor, a criminal law professor, former prosecutor,
and one-time director of a capital defense clinic in Virginia, proclaimed to
his many students that the only place they could really make a difference
was in a prosecutor's office. Yet, more quietly, he told some of us that we
did not have the stomach to prosecute. It was easy to take that observation
as a compliment, to be marked as a golden child, so tender and noble that
locking people up for a living was out of reach. As the prosecutors took
pride in doing the only work where they could make a real difference, I, like
Davis, spent many years doing the gritty work, hanging out in jails, and

4

5
6

7

ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE (2007).
Id. at vii.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 11-12.
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routinely answering the question, "How can you represent those people?"
with references to Jesus. 8
It was not until years later, when preparing to give a short talk at my
mentor's memorial service in 2006, that I realized I had misunderstood his
secret message. It was not that I was too good to prosecute; I wasn't good
enough. If I ever got a taste of it, I would love prosecuting people. I would
wrap myself in a cloak of righteousness and rely on my personal
"philosophy and proclivities ... instead of on legal principles, standards,
and guidelines.,,9 The zealousness with which one should defend in
criminal cases does not extend to the prosecution. Zealots lack discretion,
which is one reason they make great defense attorneys. Prosecutors, when
doing their job the right way, should carry the weight of the world on their
shoulders, tabling personal conviction in favor of thoughtful, objective
standards.
In this Review, I will recount Davis's tremendous contribution to the
current conversation in the United States about the role of prosecutors. I
will delve more specifically into the power of the prosecutor in capital
cases, and I will contend that, in those cases, prosecutors have a moral
obligation to exercise their discretion with abundance. Finally, I will
conclude with an examination of Davis's calls for reform and
accountability.
Davis's short historical review of the creation and role of the
prosecutor starts with the political genesis of the office in 1643. IO The first
public prosecutor served at the pleasure of both the court and the governor
of Virginia, and Davis explains in her first chapter not only how prosecutors
ultimately came to have discretion but also why the court rarely checks that
discretion. II The sophistication of the criminal justice system, marked by
the proliferation of criminal statutes from the legislature, increased the need
for prosecutors to exercise discretion in choosing which crimes to
prosecute. With statutory violations, prosecutors must act as a first line of
review in determining what the intent of the legislature was when it passed
the statute criminalizing certain conduct. Using gambling as an example,
Davis argues that legislatures that have criminalized gambling have done so
to stop large-scale operations and the attendant racketeering activities. She
points out that every time a prosecutor does not prosecute the players in a

8 See Un cas McThenia, A Tribute to Roger D. Groot: A Man Standing High, 64 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 41,44-45 (2007).
9 DAVIS, supra note 4, at 89.
1O/d.at10.
II /d. at 14; see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,607 (1985).

J. AMY DILLARD

1298

[Vol. 97

private poker game, he has exercised some discretion m interpreting the
legislative intent. 12
The American Bar Association ("ABA") standards advise prosecutors
about how they should perform their duties and how best to exercise their
discretion. 13 The ABA promulgates the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility that governs the conduct of all attorneys; the vast majority of
states have adopted some version of the Model Rules. 14 There is only one
provision within the ABA's framework, Rule 3.8, that is specifically
directed towards prosecutors. IS The goal of Rule 3.8 is to promote the fair
administration of justice and the appropriate exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. 16 Davis's primary complaint with the system stems from the fact

12

DAVIS,

supra note 4, at 13.

(2007), available at http://www.abanet.org!
cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html.
14 DAVIS, supra note 4, at 144.
15 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8.
13

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
cause;
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the
procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such
as the right to a preliminary hearing;
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with
sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information
known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a
protective order of the tribunal;
(e) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about
a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:
(\) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;
(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation
or prosecution; and
(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information;
(f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the

prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making
extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of
the accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel,
employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from
making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under
Rule 3.6 or this Rule.
16

DAVIS,

supra note 4, at 145; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8.
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that the standards are aspirational: the prosecutor exercises discretion even
when he chooses whether to follow the standards. 17 Moreover, the judicial
and legislative branches have no meaningful review over this tremendous
power. Even in states with laws governing the standards for prosecutors,
there is no method of accountability when the prosecutor disregards the
standards. IS
In her chapters on charging crimes, making deals, and handling
victims, Davis reviews the daily duties of the prosecutor and assesses the
challenges and attendant responsibilities.
She makes the point that
prosecutors feel compelled to "do the right thing" even if they cannot prove
their case with the available evidence. 19 But prosecutors, likewise, get
overly focused on the available evidence, which at times lines up for the
successful prosecution of someone who needs not be prosecuted. Davis
uses Marcus Dixon as the best example of the latter. 20 Dixon, an eighteenyear-old black football star and honor student in Georgia, had sex with a
fifteen-year-old white girl. The prosecutor charged Dixon with every
possible sex offense, all stemming from a single sexual encounter. The jury
ultimately acquitted Dixon on all counts except the one involving
consensual sex offenses with a minor. Even though the legislator who had
written the statutory sex crimes legislation declared that he never intended it
to be used against someone like Dixon, the competitive prosecutor wanted
the conviction, perhaps to justify all his hard work?1 Given the facts, Davis
argues that the prosecutor was not abiding by the ABA standards and
seeking justice in every case, but Davis is also quick to point out that the
prosecutor did not have to follow the standards, as there is no avenue for
recourse. The Georgia Supreme Court's reversal of Dixon's conviction did
not remedy the abject prosecutorial abuse of power, and while the Court
made implicit reference to the abuse of discretion in overcharging, it did not
expressly reprimand the prosecutor, as it had no avenue for doing SO?2
Davis maintains a steady focus on the role of race throughout, though
the book itself is not a study in race relations. She simply includes race in
her descriptions, as with Marcus Dixon, with the recognition that one
cannot consider an allegation of prosecutorial abuse of discretion without
acknowledging the historical and current role that race plays in the decision
to prosecute. By reflecting on the historical role of race, Davis justifies her
17

IS

ANN.
19
20

21
22

DAVIS, supra note 4, at 15.
/d. at 200 n.70; see also, e.g., MD. CT. R., R. 16-812 (LexisNexis 2005); W.VA. CODE
§ 7-4-1 (2006).
DAVIS, supra note 4, at 30.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id.; see also Dixon v. State, 596 S.E.2d 147, 149-51 (Ga. 2004).
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position that most prosecutors are unconsciously influenced by race when
determining which crimes to prosecute. One of the clearest examples of
race affecting the exercise or abuse of discretion may be seen in how a
prosecutor relates to a victim, and here Davis directly addresses race
issues. 23 Davis asserts that prosecutors do their job with more vigor, in
some cases improperly casting themselves as attorneys for the victim, when
the victim is white and privileged. 24 This observation stems from the fact
that all prosecutors enjoy the privilege of a white-collar profession and
many prosecutors are white.
Davis uses the world of domestic violence cases to explore the failure
of the prosecutor to keep his role in an appropriate perspective. 25 In cases
of domestic violence, the prosecutor gets to stand on the moral high ground,
championing the rights of the abused spouse and removing the abuser to
jail.26 Often, though, prosecutors lose sight of the victim in these cases, and
following with Davis's assertion that prosecutors care most about victims
with whom they relate, the battered woman who does not want to prosecute
her abuser may seem extremely foreign. Anyone who has taught criminal
law to first-year students has witnessed the confusion over personal
conviction in the context of the professional role of prosecutor in domestic
violence cases. Most students, instinctively, do not find themselves
inclined to defend those accused of domestic assault charges. But when the
tables are turned and the victim kills, the prosecutor must prosecute the
battered woman who is the original victim. In such a case, the prosecutor
often is so focused on the successful prosecution that he fails to recognize
the conflict of having pressured the victim to prosecute her batterer, then
turning around and prosecuting the battered woman who defends herself.27
Whether ignoring the unfamiliar victim or becoming overly involved with
the familiar victim, the prosecutor who fails to keep an appropriate level of
objective discretion injects his own philosophy into the process and alters
the effect and quality of process received by individual defendants as a
result.
Through her examination of the practices of over-charging and
manipulative plea-bargaining, and the misguided relationships with victims,
Davis addresses the subtle ways that prosecutors fail to uphold their duties.
When she turns to full-fledged misconduct, her focus shifts to the lack of
oversight and accountability for prosecutors who break the rules. Unlike
DAVIS, supra note 4, at 71.
Id. at 76.
25 Id. at 66.
26 Id. at 67-68.
27 See also id. at 68-69; Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1996).
23

24
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the Nifong debacle, the vast majority of prosecutorial misconduct goes
undetected, and thus unchallenged,zs Davis methodically walks the reader
through the few studies of prosecutorial misconduct, leaving the reader to
conclude that very few prosecutors are investigated on bar complaints when
facing an allegation of misconduct. In the rare cases where a bar
association does investigate, only a small number of prosecutors experience
any punishment. 29 Other avenues of complaining of misconduct meet with
similarly lackadaisical responses and sheer opprobrium from prosecutors.
For example, in 2003, Federal District Court Judge Gerald Bruce Lee,
sitting in the Eastern District of Virginia, presided over the kidnapping and
inveiglement trial of Jay Lentz. 3D After the jury found Lentz guilty, Judge
Lee discovered that a critical piece of evidence, the victim's day planner,
had been erroneously given to the jury after he had ruled it inadmissible.
Because only the prosecutor had possession of the day planner, Judge Lee
reached the reasonable conclusion that the prosecutor, whose zealousness in
the prosecution was called into question because of a past personal
relationship with the victim, had intentionally placed the excluded evidence
in boxes of evidence that went to the jury for consideration. Jurors were
questioned and remarked that the day planner had been a dispositive piece
of evidence in their decision to convict Lentz. 3l Judge Lee overturned the
jury verdict. On the government's appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed,
taking the very rare step of finding that the district court had clearly erred in
finding misconduct. Without addressing the prosecutor's motives, the
Fourth Circuit simply found that the evidence was not sufficient for a
finding that the prosecutor "intentionally placed" the excluded day planners
with the jury.32 In this extremely rare case of a trial judge finding
prosecutorial misconduct, the appellate court was more comfortable finding
that a federal judge had erred rather than finding that a federal prosecutor
had abused his power.
Intentional Brady violations, the common practice whereby the
prosecutor fails to disclose exculpatory evidence, seem to be the only
misconduct that will routinely result in punishment of the offending
prosecutor. 33 For all of Nifong's overreaching in the Duke Lacrosse team
rape prosecution, he was seen by many as a champion for the mistreated

supra note 4, at 126.
Id. at 129.
30 United States v. Lentz, 383 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2004).
31 !d. at 209-10; see also Jerry Markon, Lentz Case Sends Chill Through Federal
Courthouse, WASH. POST, May 10,2004, at B01.
32 Lentz, 383 F.3d at 210.
33 DAVIS, supra note 4, at 130-31; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
28 DAVIS,

29
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black population of Durham, North Carolina. 34 Nifong seemed to be the
rare prosecutor who was not influenced by an ability to relate to the victim,
as he put aside the victim's unsavory profession as a stripper in favor of
prosecuting privileged defendants from his same racial background;
however, when the news broke that Nifong had hidden exculpatory
evidence from the defense, evidence that exonerated the defendants of
sexual assault (though not of racist, immature behavior), Nifong lost all
support. 35 Failing to disclose Brady evidence is a common occurrence, but
when intense scrutiny is not focused on the prosecutor by the media,
multiple lawyers, and powerful defendants, the offending prosecutors are
rarely caught. 36
The daily burdens of prosecution challenge the most thoughtful and
objective prosecutors, and prosecuting a capital case with diligence and
proper discretion compounds the standard burdens. It is not a job for the
overly competitive, nor a place for one who relates job performance to
winning. Many states have implemented strict standards for attorneys
eligible for appointment to defend in capital cases,37 but no such standard
for experience governs who may prosecute a capital case. The law swirling
around capital crimes is intricate and makes up a disproportionate
percentage of all petitions for certiorari granted by the Supreme Court. The
emotional demands of dealing with a victim's family or a crowd of
vengeful police officers or of facing a disappointed electorate challenge the
most prepared in the field of prosecutors. Approaching capital prosecution
unenthusiastically means the end of a career; approaching capital
prosecution enthusiastically is a moral abyss.
The ABA's commentary on the "Special Responsibilities of a
Prosecutor" describes the prosecutor as a "minister of justice. ,,38 "Minister"
is defined as "a servant, attendant; one who waits upon, or ministers to the
wants of another.,,39 He is no mere advocate for his position, and the
responsibility carries a specific obligation to see that each defendant "is
accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of
sufficient evidence.,,4o Harry Blackmun explicitly found that prosecutors
could not shoulder this heavy burden in the death context: "Rather than

34

See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Jocks and Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,2006, § 4, at

13.
3S See Adam Liptak, Prosecutor Becomes Prosecuted, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2007, at
Weekend.
36 DAVIS, supra note 4, at 131.
37 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.8(E)(2004).
38 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2007).
39 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 817-18 (2d ed. 1989).
40 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. I.
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continue to coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has
been achieved... I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to
concede that the death penalty experiment has failed."41
The prosecutor bears the sole responsibility for setting the death
machine in motion, and in high profile capital cases, prosecutors are most
susceptible to political and community pressure for revenge. 42 I contend
that the duty to "minister" to the capital defendant carries additional moral
obligations, since "death is different.,,43 Presuming that a prosecutor
charges capital murder when the facts alleged fit the statutory crime, the
prosecutor must still declare whether he seeks death as a possible penalty or
whether he will proceed with "life without parole" as the only sentencing
option for the jury. This continuing duty to evaluate whether death is an
appropriate option at all stages of the proceedings is a significant and
challenging duty for prosecutors.
Even after making a decision to charge capital murder and to seek the
death penalty, the prosecutor has a continuing responsibility to be a minister
of justice. When the prosecutor learns that the capital defendant has
significant mental deficiencies that may render him unsuitable for execution
under Atkins, the prosecutor should be "a servant ... who ministers to the
wants of another.'.44 His own interests aside, he must carry out his specific
obligation to see that the defendant is not subjected to a penalty for which
the defendant is not suited. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Roper v. Simmons, for example, a prosecutor would be abusing his
discretion by seeking death against a juvenile. 45
It follows then that a prosecutor may similarly abuse his discretion by
seeking the death penalty for a mentally deficient defendant, following the
2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia. 46 One of the most complex demands on
a prosecutor in a capital case is the exercise of discretion where there is
significant, compelling evidence that the defendant is mentally retarded.

Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141,1145 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
DAVIS, supra note 4, at 78, 89; see also id. at 85-89 (detailing the experiences of
Robert Johnson and Kamala Harris, two black prosecutors who chose not to seek death in
high-profile capital prosecutions).
43/d. at 134; see, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
44 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note
39, at 817-18.
45 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid
imposition of a death sentence on any offender who was under the age of eighteen at the
time he committed a capital crime).
46 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that execution of a mentally retarded criminal constitutes
"cruel and unusual" punishment and is excessive and, thus, prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment).
41

42
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The Court in Atkins held that the Eighth Amendment places a substantive
restriction on the State's power to take the life of the mentally retarded
offender. The most obvious way to enforce the "substantive restriction" is
to presume life, which would require a prosecutor's pre-trial assessment of
death-eligibility.47
Arguably, all death penalty analysis should begin with the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, requiring in any capital sentencing that
the prosecution prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] death [penalty]
is the only appropriate penalty.,,48
In the past twenty-five years,
presumptions in favor of criminal defendants at every stage of the
proceedings have become more prevalent in legal commentary, some state
court opinions, empirical studies, and important court decisions. 49 While
the Court has never declared that a capital defendant is entitled to the
presumption of life, the prosecutor, as a minister of justice for the
defendant, should actively honor issues, like mental retardation, that could
or should preclude a death sentence. It is the determination of what should
preclude a death sentence that requires prosecutors to step outside of their
politics, proclivities, and ideologies, and to assess the procedure and the
evidence in a way that will protect the capital defendant. 50
The notion of a presumption of life grows directly from the
presumption of innocence. 51 This core principle of the criminal justice
system values the individual's liberty interest over the government's
interest in prosecution. 52 The prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt for every element of the case, operating to assure
leniency toward the defendant by giving him the benefit of the doubt. 53
Capital sentencing puts the defendant's most fundamental right-the right
to life-at risk. Because the defendant's liberty interest trumps the
prosecution's interest in obtaining incarceration in criminal trials, it follows
that the defendant's life interest would also trump the prosecution's interest
in obtaining a death sentence.
Like all juries, the death-qualified jury is made up of ordinary people
who have no special expertise, and who must cope, especially in capital

Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986».
Beth S. Brinkman, The Presumption of Life: A Starting Point for a Due Process
Analysis of Capital Sentencing, 94 YALE L.J. 351, 352-53 (1984).
49 See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
50 See DAVIS, supra note 4, at 89.
51 See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,490 (1978) (examining the long precedent for
the presumption of innocence).
52 Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 457, 458 (1989).
53 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
47
48
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trials, with complex emotions, facts, and instructions. 54 Total impartiality is
impossible for any juror, and jurors often resort to arbitrary factors, such as
race and religion, when choosing to impose a death sentence. 55 The mere
appearance of due process fools no one who studies the results in capital
trials. Even thirty-five years after Furman v. Georgia,56 the possible
reasons a jury may impose a death sentence are about as predictable as
being "struck by lightning."
Prosecutors may preemptively remove potential jurors who "would
automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment.,,57 All
capital trials have a bifurcated sentencing phase and thus the duty of the
capital jury is two-fold: deciding the guilt-innocence phase and then
deciding the life-death phase. After the prosecution peremptorily strikes
those potential jurors who foreclose the possibility of a death sentence, the
remaining jurors are often white, male, Protestant, and "are more likely to
be prejudiced-to be racist, sexist, and homophobic" than the juror pool
from which they were selected. 58 Death-qualified, or Witherspoon, jurors
are more likely to defer to prosecutors, less likely to feel sympathy for the
defendant, and generally more prone to convicting in all criminal cases. 59
Most scholars focus on how prosecutors can abuse the death-qualifying voir
dire process to select the jury most likely to convict the defendant. The
original decision to seek a death sentence in the infamous Andrea Yates
case raised this concern among those in the capital defense community.6o
To avoid jurors who would feel the most sympathy for Yates, the
prosecutor sought the death penalty and death-qualified the jury, resulting
in, at least initially, a jury that was unwilling to accept Yates's affirmative
insanity defense.

54 Jose Felipe Anderson, When the Wall Has Fallen: Decades of Failure in the
Supervision of Capital Juries, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 741, 749-50 (2000).
55 See William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale. Design. and Preview of
Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1071 (1995); Theodore Eisenberg et aI., The Deadly
Paradox of Capital Jurors, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 371, 380-87 (2001).
56
408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
57 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
58 See Adam Liptak, Ruling Likely to Spur Convictions in Capital Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2007; see also Brooke Butler & Gary Moran, The Role of Death Qualification and
the Need for Cognition in Venirepersons' Evaluations of Expert Scientific Testimony in
Capital Trials, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 561 (2007).
59 See. e.g., Claudia L. Cowan et aI., The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors'
Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53
(1984); James R.P. Ogloff & Sonia R. Chopra, Stuck in the Dark Ages: Supreme Court
Decision Making and Legal Developments, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 397, 391 (2004).
60 See Lisa Teachey, DA Will Seek to Put Yates on Death Row, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug.
9,2001, at AI.
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The Supreme Court has consistently held that the death-qualifying voir
dire practice is constitutional, but it has never mandated that the same jury
hear both phases of the capital tria1.6 I Frankly, this is the only result that
makes capital prosecution possible because the verdict for death must be
unanimous and jurors who would never impose death would nullify a death
request from the prosecution. 62
Prosecutors like those in the Yates case abuse their discretion when
they choose to seek death in order to seat a death-disposed jury for the
"back-stop" purpose of getting a conviction. 63 The function of the
prosecutor is "to seek justice, not merely to convict.,,64 Moreover,
prosecutors should "seek to reform and improve the administration of
criminal justice" and "must exercise sound discretion in the performance of
[their] duties.,,65 Prosecutors should make an independent probable cause
determination before proceeding on any charges against the defendant and
should not pursue prosecution in cases where the evidence is insufficient to
support a conviction. 66 In making the decision to pursue a charge, the
prosecutor must consider his own "reasonable doubt that the accused is in
fact guilty.,,67 Moreover, if the defendant suffers from mental retardation,
the prosecutor abuses his discretion when he ignores this significant issue
and seats Witherspoon jurors, assuming they will not apply the law from
Atkins.
Federal prosecutors must work through a detailed report before
seeking death, including the preparation of a "Death Penalty Evaluation,"
vetted by the main justice. 68 When determining whether it is appropriate to
seek the death penalty, the charging U.S. Attorney must weigh the
mitigating factors against the aggravating factors. 69 These safeguards, once
thought to make the federal capital prosecution machine more careful and
deliberative, were ignored and overridden by the hyper-political Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales. 70 Paul K. Charlton, who was among the U.S.
Attorneys fired in December 2006, testified before a Senate judiciary panel
61 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
429 (1985).
62 See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 165.
63 DAVIS, supra note 4, at 33.
64 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE R. 3-1.2(c) (1993), available at http://www.abanet.
orglcrimjustlstandards/pfunc_blk.html.
65 Id. at 3-1.2(b)( d).
66 Id. at 3-3.9(a).
67 Id. at 3-3.9(b )(i).
68 U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-10.040 (2007).
69 Id. § 9-10.080.
70 See DAVIS, supra note 4, at 80; Amy Goldstein, Fired Prosecutor Says Gonzales
Pushed Death Penalty, WASH. POST, June 28, 2007, at A7.
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that "Gonzales [had] been overzealous in ordering federal prosecutors to
seek the death penalty.,,71 Charlton spoke as a model prosecutor on the
issue of capital prosecution, proclaiming, "[N]o decision is more important
for a prosecutor than whether or not to ... deliberately and methodically
take a life."n Charlton maintained that he should not seek death in a
murder prosecution that lacked important forensic evidence, namely a
murder weapon, any DNA evidence, and the victim's body. He fought to
discuss the case with his supervisors, but Gonzales refused to hear
Charlton's concerns and simply sent a letter directing Charlton to seek
death. When Charlton requested a ten-minute meeting with Gonzales, he
was placed on the "firing list" for "repeated instances of defiance,
insubordination." 73
The original intent of the former Attorney General's oversight of
capital prosecutions was to safeguard against local U.S. Attorneys falling
prey to the pressures that Davis articulates in Chapter Five,74 but with the
overt politicization in the Justice Department during the tenure of Alberto
Gonzales, seeking death is the new marching order for local federal
prosecutors. In 2006, Gonzales overruled recommendations not to seek the
death penalty by U.S. Attorneys twenty-one times, up from three such
overrulings in 2005. 75 The protocol intended to prevent overzealous
prosecution in capital cases has backfired, and the remote politician has
taken control over the process, resulting in the arbitrary decision-making
against which Davis warns. 76 Moreover, following in the shameful tradition
of the Thornburgh Memo, which instructed U.S. Attorneys to ignore local
bar rules prohibiting contact with represented defendants,77 the Justice
Department is now changing its internal regulations to give Gonzales's
successors the authority to fast-track death appeals. 78 That Gonzales
"supported the aggressive use of death penalty authority in the federal
courts" is an understatement, and the policy to seek death without regard to
mitigating factors is a clear violation of the ABA's guidelines for
prosecutors. Perhaps this recent tum marks the best reason for the reforms
that Davis proposes. 79
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76 DAVIS, supra note 4, at 89.
77 /d. at 113-14.
78 Dan Eggen, Gonzales to Get Power in Death Penalty Cases, WASH. POST, Aug. 15,
2007, at A2.
79 DAVIS, supra note 4, at 179.
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To amplify the need for reform, Davis walks the reader through the
lack of prosecutorial accountability, noting that while the Constitution is
silent on this specific issue, the defining premise of the Constitution is
accountability.8o Its system of checks and balances does not restrain
prosecutorial misconduct and overreaching. 81 Davis points to two arenasthe electoral process and the media-that could police prosecutors, but
demonstrates how both are susceptible to manipulation by prosecutors. 82
Because the ABA Guidelines are not mandatory and the election and
appointment processes are overtly politicized, the prosecutor lacks any clear
external motivation to serve as a responsible minister of justice. Moreover,
the image of prosecutors on television as champions of justice bears little
resemblance to those who hide exculpatory evidence and zealously seek to
satisfy their personal vendettas. 83 Finally, while the news media followed
the Gonzales saga closely and with careful criticism, the same reporters
championed Nifong for the unpopular prosecution of white college boys
accused of raping a black stripper only to realize later that they had missed
the real story of prosecutorial misconduct. If society is counting on the
news media to serve as watchdog over prosecutors, none of us is very safe.
Davis argues any efforts towards reform will stand a better chance of
success if prosecutors engage in and encourage reform as a form of selfgovernance. 84 Legislatures have not heeded the calls from defense
attorneys for reform, and, sadly, it may have taken the U.S. Attorney firings
and the high-profile misconduct of Nifong to get the attention needed to
initiate reform. National, state, and local bar associations could investigate
claims of misconduct more vigorously, forcing prosecutors to follow the
discretionary guidelines with the specter of investigation for those who
ignore the guidelines. 85
I agree with Davis that any true reform will come from prosecutors
themselves. As Davis acknowledges, many in the profession feel the moral
imperative to set aside personal conviction in favor of seeing the case
objectivell6 or, as in the situations where mentally retarded defendants are
charged with capital murder, seeing the case in the light most favorable to
the defendant. The job is hard enough for the best prepared and best
tempered. I do not envy their burden.
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